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On the 11th of July, 1928, the front page of the Honolulu Pacific Advertiser 
read: "75 per cent white blood satisfies U.S." The article reported what seems 
to be the landmark decision of U.S. District Court Judge William Lymer to 
allow a racially mixed Pacific Islander—Alfred Milner Stephen—to naturalize 
to U.S. citizenship. While the discussion focused on naturalization and 
citizenship, in Stephen's case, blood racialization also played a key role. By 
blood quantum logic, Stephen was identified as three-quarters English and one-
quarter Polynesian, the latter inherited from his mother, who was referred to as 
"half English and half Polynesian." Judge Lymer argued that Stephen's 
"predominance" of "white blood" qualified him for citizenship. 
In 1790, when Congress passed a law to establish a uniform standard for 
naturalization—the Nationality Act—it was limited to "all free white persons."1 
Although Congress amended the Nationality Act in 1870, it did so only to conform 
to the intent of the Reconstruction amendments by expanding eligibility for 
naturalization only to "aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent" 
(Ancheta 1998, 23). Judge Lymer, who made clear that he was determining 
whether Stephen was a "white person" within the meaning of the 1870 nationality 
law, made him, in the words of Ian Haney Lopez, "white by law" (1996). 
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In his formative work on the legal construction of race, Lopez details the 
production of whiteness through legal processes, with a special focus on 
citizenship and naturalization. He examines a series of cases from the early 
twentieth century in which state and federal courts sought to determine who was 
white enough to naturalize as a U.S. citizen.2 These cases addressing the "racial 
prerequisites" to citizenship were at the center of racial debates in the United 
States during this period. Between 1840 and 1924, as Matthew Frye Jacobson 
argues, politics entered an "arena where race was the prevailing idiom for 
discussing citizenship and the relative merits of a given people" (1998, 9). 
"Whiteness" was granted to some and not others, as was citizenship. Without a 
complete list of those ineligible for citizenship, however, individuals who 
petitioned for naturalization compelled the courts into a case-by-case struggle 
to define who was a "white person" (Lopez 1996, 92; Konvitz 1946, 96). In 
essence, courts "were responsible for deciding not only who was White, but 
why someone was White" (Lopez 1996, 3; emphasis in original). 
Lopez has distinguished between two different rationales that federal judges 
used to justify the racial distinctions that their decisions addressed: scientific 
evidence and common knowledge (1996, 5-9). Scientific evidence rationales 
were legitimated by the authority of "science" and were based on naturalistic, 
purportedly objective, systematic studies of humankind that classified humans 
with a focus on "natural physical differences" that provided the criteria for racial 
divisions and hierarchies. Common knowledge rationales, on the other hand, 
appealed to popular, widely-held conceptions of and belief s about race and racial 
categories. Beginning in 1878, racial prerequisites for naturalization were tested 
in the courts by foreign-born applicants from Japan, China, Burma, Hawai'i, 
and the Philippines, and the precedents that these decisions established became 
the criteria for definitions of "whiteness" that characterized American law until 
1952. 
However, the justifications for racial prerequisites changed. For over thirty 
years in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries courts assumed that 
scientific evidence and common knowledge were consistent in defining who 
was "white." But, as contradictions between scientific evidence and common 
knowledge became more pronounced (e.g. as when anthropologists classified 
some dark-skinned people as Caucasians), courts increasingly came to rely on 
common knowledge justifications alone (Lopez 1996, 7). 
The Stephen case revealed the confusion surrounding the "scientific" and 
"common knowledge" definitions of whiteness. In petitioning for naturalization, 
Stephen was challenging longstanding legal precedent based on "scientific 
evidence" and "common knowledge," but, as courts increasingly relied on the 
latter, it became apparent that the two definitions could no longer be reconciled. 
Judge Lymer reflected this problem when he remarked that the Stephen case 
was the first time a federal court had considered status of a person with "more 
than half white blood" and "less than one half Polynesian, Malay, or Oriental 
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blood."3 The Stephen case reveals the complicated intersections of race and 
nation in early twentieth-century American culture. 
This essay discusses the rationales that guided the judge's decision. It was 
the "predominance" of whiteness mixed with Stephen's "Polynesian blood" that 
made the difference in the court's decision. But that factor alone did not motivate 
Judge Lymer's decision. Pervasive notions about the potential for Hawaiians to 
assimilate and to fulfill the requirements of American citizenship were also crucial 
in this ruling. Although the court recognized Stephen as Polynesian, it deemed 
him white enough to become American. Stephen could be de-racialized as a 
legal subject in the courtroom because of racial logic that assumed the easy 
assimilation of Polynesians based on the historical treatment of racially mixed 
Hawaiians. Hawaiians and some other Pacific Islanders—in this case Stephen 
was identified as a Polynesian who came from "Neuru Island"4—were 
inconsistently incorporated into whiteness through a process of selective 
assimilation. That is, they were selectively incorporated as whites when racially 
mixed (depending on degree), where white "blood"—in relation to indigenous 
"blood"—has been figured as a solvent. 
This is a selective process of assimilation not only because it depends on 
the degree of mixed-status, in blood logic, but also because it is distinctive to 
indigenous racialization.5 For indigenous peoples, blood has typically been 
evoked to assimilate. Since the late nineteenth century, blood quantum has been 
an integral part of racial formation in the United States, with unique consequences 
for indigenous peoples. This racial regime was first imposed on American Indians, 
and it served as a legal and ideological precedent for its use against Hawaiians. 
As Thomas Biolsi (1995) and Joanne Marie Barker (1995) have argued for the 
case of American Indians, blood quantum is a technology of individuation, one 
that classifies according to gradient. It is contrary to traditional Native social 
practices but was consistent with white efforts to assimilate Natives. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially the declining population of 
American Indians made the prospects of their assimilation more palatable and 
facilitated the project of American expansion, deracination, and incorporation 
into the U.S. nation-state, while it also perhaps mitigated anxieties of 
miscegenation. And these factors bolstered the ideology of the "Vanishing Indian" 
(Dippie 1982). White Americans have seen the mixed-race status of Natives 
(e.g. half-breed, quarter-blood, one-eighth, one-sixteenth, etc.) as a desired 
outcome of cultural, structural, and biological assimilation, but it has also been 
a condition that disqualifies certain individuals from claims to land rights and 
other entitlements. 
I will use two different contexts—the relationship between naturalization 
and citizenship (in Stephen's case), on the one hand, and the issues of land and 
citizenship (in the Hawaiian case), on the other—to demonstrate the complicated 
ways in which the politics of blood are manifested. Stephen's case allows for a 
discussion of blood construction in a terrain that shows two different ways of 
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thinking about race—as both category and continuum. Interrogating the 
construction of racial categories from the vantage of Hawai'i provides a valuable 
perspective on their mutual constitutions and the range of variation in that 
process.6 Moreover, however contradictory and complex these racial formations 
are, they are far from arbitrary; indeed, they function to maintain the hegemony 
of whiteness. 
Satisfying the United States 
Alfred Milner Stephen had migrated to Hawai'i from "Neuru Island" at the 
age of eleven. According to the case file, he was educated at McKinley High 
School in Honolulu and worked at the Hawai'i Visitors' Bureau for almost a 
decade before applying for naturalization. There is some confusion about his 
ancestry. By blood quantum figures, Stephen was identified as three-quarters 
English and one-quarter Polynesian. Stephen testified that his mother was of the 
"Polynesian race" but he later described her as "part English and part Marshall 
Island" (Stephen 1928, 1-2). It is unclear then whether he was of Nauru Island 
ancestry at all or if his mother was connected to either the Marshall Islands or 
Nauru. Whether he was Marshallese and/or Nauruan, or something else entirely, 
it is curious that he relied on the category of Polynesian (as both Nauru and the 
Marshall Islands are typically considered part of Micronesia) and was recognized 
as such throughout the hearing (Lymer 1928, 2).7 Stephen described his father 
as the son of an English lieutenant in the British Navy who moved to the Marshall 
Islands at a young age (2). When asked by the Judge if his father was of "pure 
white blood," Stephen answered yes, noting that his father had been born in 
Plymouth, England (2). If this were the case, then Stephen might have been a 
British subject, as Nauru was a British mandate at the time, as paternity dictated 
British citizenship in their colonies.8 If a British subject at the time, Stephen 
might have been eligible to naturalize; the immigration law of 1924, which guided 
U.S. naturalization policy, considered the offspring of European settlers in 
colonies, mandates, and protectorates as Europeans, so long as they did not 
belong to a racial group deemed "ineligible to citizenship" (like Stephen's 
mother). Still, from the case records, there is no evidence that Judge Lymer 
considered Stephen's father's citizenship status, although he seemed moved by 
what he later characterized as his "exceptionally valuable British stock" (his 
racial status). 
For Judge Lymer, Stephen's case posed an important legal question that 
federal courts had not yet addressed: was a person with "predominating white 
blood, yet having an appreciable strain of brown or yellow or red blood" (1928, 
3) eligible to naturalize? Lymer noted that state codes were not uniform; a person 
of mixed racial descent might be considered "white" in one state and "colored" 
in another. Thus Lymer needed to articulate some kind of federal standard about 
who might count as "white" in the 1870 statute. Lymer identified three 
possibilities. A strict reading of the statute might require "absolutely pure white 
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blood." A more open reading might disqualify only applicants who had an 
"appreciable strain" of "colored blood." And third, more flexible yet, the statute 
could be interpreted as holding that if the applicant's "prepondering blood" was 
more than half white, then she or he should be deemed a "white person" (4). 
To guide him as he chose among these three options, Lymer turned to In re 
Rodriguez—the sole racial prerequisite case between 1878 and 1909 in which 
an applicant's naturalization petition was granted—as a precedent. In re 
Rodriguez was an 1897 federal court decision that ruled that a "pure-blooded 
Mexican" applicant from Texas could be admitted to citizenship. Although the 
court did not believe that Rodriguez was white, it decided that Rodriguez could 
become a citizen because of a series of treaties that conferred "citizenship on 
Spaniards and Mexicans in the wake of U.S. expansion into Florida and the 
Southwest" (Lopez 1996, 61).9 Still, Lymer read the case as one about the 
"preponderance of white blood" being sufficient to secure citizenship, although 
the Rodriguez case specifically addressed the question of citizenship for 
Mexicans living in conquered territories incorporated into the United States, 
not naturalization, per se.10 Noting that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that 
had recognized the right of Mexicans to become naturalized citizens had been 
abrogated, Lymer concluded that the only way in which the decision to allow 
Rodriguez to naturalize could be supported would be because, after three hundred 
years of occupation and control in Mexico, "the Spanish race had 'established 
itself,' so that Mexicans were presumed to be of substantially white strain." 
Lymer thus decided that "a race of persons possessing a predominating quantity 
of white blood would be considered 'white persons' within the meaning of our 
naturalization law" (1928, 10). 
Having decided that a person with a "preponderance" of white blood could 
naturalize, Lymer then posed the question: "what proportion of the colored blood 
may an applicant possess and yet be adjudged a 'white person'?" (5). Lymer 
simply could not believe that Congress had intended to restrict naturalization 
only to an applicant who could show "that he is of 100 per cent white blood" 
(Lymer 1928,4). Lymer further noted that "free white person" as a designation 
had already included various peoples known to be "readily assimilable" with 
the American people and their laws, customs, institutions and religion, and thus 
understood the category to be expansive (5). He even noted that the word "white" 
was first inserted into U.S. naturalization laws for the purpose of wholly excluding 
Black people from citizenship, and that the term was later omitted but re-inserted 
again when Congress revised the laws because of apprehension of Chinese 
immigration. Judge Lymer clearly saw the selective instability and expandability 
of the "white" category. His notion of it was not based on assumptions of absolute 
racial purity. But the key in the case would be how assimilable the group of 
color to which the petitioner belonged was perceived. 
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Common Knowledge and Polynesians 
Common knowledge about racial groups became crucial, for it was important 
to Lymer that the applicant be able to "naturally" and easily assimilate. Judge 
Lymer had to consider what kind of citizens those that are "practically white" 
would make, and so he relied on common notions about racially-mixed 
Polynesians generally and racially-mixed Hawaiians specifically. Moreover, 
blood quantum logic within the context of Lymer's reliance on a common 
knowledge rationale was crucial. 
As Lopez traces the legal shift from relying on scientific knowledge to 
determining cases on the basis of common knowledge alone, he notes that the 
cases from Najour ( 1909) to Dow ( 1914) set the parameters of the debate between 
scientific evidence and common knowledge in terms of whether white persons 
were Caucasians (a "scientific" distinction) or, from a common knowledge 
perspective, were "generally known to be White" (77).'* The consequences of 
accepting existing scientific definitions of racial categories was that if courts 
accepted all those categorized as Caucasians as white persons, people generally 
seen as non-white (e.g. Asian Indians) would have become "white," at least for 
the purposes of citizenship (72). For example, in Stephen's case, had the judge 
relied on scientific evidence instead, he might have ruled in favor of him because 
Polynesians were at that time categorized as an "Oceanic branch of the Caucasian 
division" (Keane cited in Lopez 1996). Therefore, as scientific rationales 
expanded the boundaries of the category far beyond popular understandings of 
"whiteness," the U.S. Supreme Court eventually retreated from the term 
"Caucasian." By 1923, the Court determined whiteness based solely on common 
knowledge (to uphold popular beliefs about racial difference), as it did when it 
first addressed the racial prerequisite issue in the cases of Ozawa v. United 
States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) and United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) 
(Lopez 1996,79).n The shift from scientific to common knowledge allowed the 
court to maintain its chief end: racial exclusion. 
But in Stephen's case, Lymer's reliance on common knowledge provided 
the basis for the rationale for inclusion, illustrating the ways in which Polynesians 
and mixed race Hawaiians were racialized as assimilable. The judge told the 
court that it was important to "consider the fact that the racial admixture which 
characterizes this applicant is of a very desirable character [,] as the history of 
Hawaii and the South Seas has clearly proven" (6). He argued that Stephen had 
"exceptionally valuable British stock" and that, given his one-fourth "Polynesian" 
ancestry, he had a blood mixture "which experience has shown furnishes the 
very highest grade of citizen-material." Yet while Lymer's arguments centrally 
recognized Polynesian racialization, his decision to allow Stephen's 
naturalization ultimately relied on his faith in Stephen's ultimate de-racialization. 
For example, he noted that his "racial type" had proven "stamina and civic 
excellence" and that "as is well known, is thoroughly assimilable; the Polynesian 
"A blood mixture" 39 
blood, in a short time, utterly disappears, leaving no trace" (Lymer 1928, 9, 
emphasis mine). 
Lymer's understanding of Polynesians' place within white society resonates 
with other popular conceptions circulating in Hawai'i during the same period. 
For example, in 1924, a prominent social figure in Honolulu, Rev. Albert W. 
Palmer, D.D., maintained in his book The Human Side of Hawaii that, "it is also 
a very fortunate thing that Hawaii's basic race is neither Caucasian, Negro, nor 
Mongolian but the kind hearted, tolerant, loveable Polynesian whose most 
characteristic contribution to present-day Hawaii is the spirit of 'aloha'" (Palmer 
1924, 73). W.A. Kinney, a pro-annexation politician in Hawai'i at the time, 
argued against Asian assimilation by aligning Hawaiians with white people, 
contending that Hawaiians were of the "same stock" as the "white race" in that 
they were of a "branch of the Aryan race" ( 1927,172). William Atherton DuPuy, 
in 1932 executive assistant to the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, commented that 
Hawaiians, as "new Americans" fit "into that scheme of self-government born 
to blue eyed people in the other side of the world and previously experienced by 
few of those who contributed to these strange intermixtures of blood" (DuPuy 
1932, ix).13 DuPuy further predicted that "there ultimately must be a fusion . . . 
Hawaiian-American" comprised of "something near one-third Japanese, one-
fifth Filipino, one-ninth Portuguese, one-tenth Hawaiian, one-twelfth Chinese, 
one-fifteenth Anglo Saxon, with a sprinkling of Korean, Puerto Rican and what 
not" (DuPuy 1932, 115-117). In DuPuy's formulation, Hawaiians were 
anticipated as a reconstituted new assimilable body consisting of a diverse 
amalgam of citizens. Finally, in another popular account, pro-eugenicist Sidney 
L. Gulick even imagined a "super race" in Hawai'i, described as "the coming 
Neo-Hawaiian American race" (Gulick 1937). 
The discourses of vanishing, dissolving, and diluted mixed-race Hawaiians 
relied upon the presumption of both cultural and biological assimilation that 
lies at the core of blood racialization. The very category of "Hawaiian" seems 
to eventually have been anticipated to develop as an all-inclusive term marked 
by geographical designation rather than any specific racial category akin to 
"Puerto Rican." But in the case of Hawaiians this strategy was tied to land 
dispossession, a way to diminish distinction, and thus indigenous claims. Studies 
produced in the 1930s by governmental officials, sociologists, and physical 
anthropologists reinforced notions of the "hybrid Hawaiian." Therein, Hawaiians 
were described as "ultimate hybrids," and a "mix of the peoples of the world," 
(Dunn 1928; Adams 1933; Adams 1937). 
Thus, it is crucial that the Hawaiians to whom Judge Lymer so favorably 
alluded in 1928 were racially mixed, for this case of selective assimilation was 
predicated upon the ultimate disappearance of bodily racial markers. Judge Lymer 
did not merely rely on Stephen's individual racial make-up; he drew comparisons 
with the Hawaiian mix and referred to Stephen as a new racial type. Before 
Lymer systematically evaluated Stephen's petition with regard to the prerequisite 
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of "white person" necessary for naturalization, he noted that Arabs, Burmese, 
Chinese, Filipinos, and Hawaiians were not "white persons." 
To affirm his assessment that Hawaiians were not counted as "white persons," 
Lymer cited the case of Kanaka Nian, 6 Utah 259, 21993 Pac. (1889), where a 
Hawaiian man residing in Utah was denied the right to naturalize to U.S. 
citizenship. In that case, the first question asked by the state court was whether 
the native inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands belonged to the white or African 
"races"—which at that time were the only racial categories eligible for 
naturalization (260). The court concluded that because the Congress explicitly 
excluded the Chinese, it had intended to exclude all other races (261).14 
Even while Hawaiians were not thought of as "white," as per the Nian case, 
it is curious that Lymer did not mention the 50-percent rule defining "native 
Hawaiian" in congressional legislation by that time, as reflected in the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission Act of 1920 (Kauanui 1999). This Act allotted approximately 
200,000 acres of lease land to Hawaiians who met the 50-percent blood criterion. 
Moreover, there was another absence in Lymer's assessment: the fact that 
Hawaiians had been enfranchised in 1900—after the Nian case. As a political 
consequence of the illegal U.S. annexation of Hawai'i in 1898, the Organic Act 
of 1900, which organized the archipelago into a colonial territory, granted 
citizenship to all Hawaiians and the vote to all men born in the territory.15 Thus, 
while race trumped nationality in immigration and naturalization law, a different 
logic, one born of the pressures of colonization, operated with regard to 
Hawaiians' citizenship status. Because the enfranchisement of Hawaiians entailed 
the domestication of a previously recognized sovereign entity (the Kingdom of 
Hawai'i), the project of erasing the Hawaiian people through discourses of de-
racialization and deracination became essential to policies of assimilation. In other 
words, dominant American policy has worked to erase Hawaiian distinctiveness 
when it is potentially tied to governance, property, and legal standing. With proper 
acknowledgement of Hawaiians' indigenous status must come a reckoning with 
particulate political status considerations, including land claims. 
There is a thread of similarity between Stephen's case for naturalization 
and the development of the 50-percent blood quantum rule used by the U.S. 
Congress at that time (and subsequently the State of Hawai'i) to define Hawaiian 
people. The 50-percent blood quantum criterion, which originates in the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission Act of 1920, defines "native Hawaiians" as "descendants 
with at least one-half blood quantum of individuals inhabiting the Hawaiian 
Islands prior to 1778." This definition determined who would be able to lease 
the allotted lands—Hawaiian Home Lands territory—for residential, agricultural, 
and pastoral purposes. Given the way in which the 50-percent rule was 
determined, it is understandable that Judge Lymer stressed that part-Hawaiians 
were suitable citizen-material (Kauanui 1999; 2002). In the 1920 congressional 
debates that led to the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, "part-Hawaiians" 
were said to be, for the most part, indistinguishable from "white persons." In 
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the equation of "part-Hawaiians" as "practically white," the subjects were always 
presumed (in unmarked ways) to have (only) white ancestry along with Hawaiian. 
On the other hand, in those same debates, those who were of Hawaiian, white, 
and Chinese ancestry were not identified as "practically white." Moreover, 
Hawaiians of mixed-Chinese ancestry were figured as a substantial threat to 
white property rights because of their supposed "alien" status as Asians. 
Whiteness was always selectively figured as the critical solvent. 
Ultimately, Hawaiians who did not meet the vagaries of the 50-percent blood 
quantum rule were deemed ineligible for land leasing on the Hawaiian Home 
Lands territory. This exclusion rested on a belief in the potential of their 
assimilability. Participants in the congressional hearings that led to the passage 
of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act described white-mixed Hawaiians to 
be fully competent in their American citizenship because of their "ambitious, 
aggressive, prolific, and industrious" nature. In other words, those Hawaiians 
of less than 50-percent blood quantum were regarded as well beyond the need 
for assistance from the U.S. government and able to secure private property on 
their own. Enactment of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act entailed 
problematic assumptions as to who would and should count as Hawaiian and 
what counting as Hawaiian would mean and signify. The example of the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission Act provides numerous examples of assumptions about the 
relationship between blood quotient and social competency (as American). And 
it was whiteness that carried the power to selectively assimilate certain Hawaiian 
subjects. 
Stephen's naturalization and citizenship case and the Hawaiian issues of 
land and citizenship were both based on the politics of blood, but they developed 
in contradictory and complicated ways. Through a common knowledge 
justification based on perceptions of racially mixed Hawaiians, Stephen was 
perceived as able to assimilate and to properly fulfill American citizenship. 
Racially mixed Pacific Islanders' eligibility to naturalize and part-Hawaiians' 
racialization were linked by a common racial logic of selective assimilation 
based on blood quantum criteria that were grounded in assumptions about the 
"preponderance of white blood" and notions about "Polynesian blood." 
Immediately after Lymer's ruling rendering Stephen eligible for 
naturalization, Sanford Wood, the U.S. Special Naturalization Examiner, 
contested Lymer's ruling. He sent notice to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
objecting "on the ground that said action of said court is contrary to the law and 
the evidence and weight of evidence adduced at the hearing heretofore... [and] 
. . . herein." In other words, to the attorney representing the United States, Stephen 
did not constitute a "free white person" under the 1870 Naturalization Act. But 
there is no record that Lymer's decision was reversed.16 The U.S. Attorney did 
not have the power to determine the court's jurisdiction. The lack of a reported 
decision at the appeals level suggests that the Circuit Court of Appeals refused 
to hear the case. It seems that the judge's decision on Stephen's naturalization 
stood. 
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Conclusion 
What are the implications of this tortured history of racial categories? While 
the bar restricting naturalization to whites (and blacks) was lifted by the 1950s, 
blood classifications continue to affect and implicate indigenous peoples in the 
United States. Even though federally recognized American Indian nations assert 
the authority to define tribal citizenship according to their own definitions, as 
the case may be, most utilize blood criterion for membership. And even though 
tribes assert their sovereign prerogative in doing so, the United States 
Government also continues to define "Native American" by a one-quarter blood 
rule in federal policy on American Indians that guides funding for housing, 
education, health, and social services. Hawaiians, on the other hand, are today 
defined by the 50-percent rule that originated in the U.S. Congress, through the 
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920. The impact of that legislation, which 
embodied assumptions of Hawaiian "character" and assimilation to white society 
that were evident in the Stephen case, endures in state policy and is today used 
by both the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (which oversees the process 
for leasing lands from the allotted territory) and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs 
(which administers programs funded by Hawaiian trust land revenues and federal 
funds) to determine who legitimately shall have access to land and programs 
legally designated for "native Hawaiians." 
For Hawaiian people, blood racialization remains critical to the ongoing 
issues of citizenship, Hawaiian identity, and sovereignty. Moreover, the blood 
quanta policies that survive in Hawai'i enable white American economic, 
political, and social domination that endures through manifestations such as the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Rice v. Cayetano (2002) which judged Hawaiian-
only voting rights in trustee elections for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs 
unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment (see Franklin and Lyons, this 
issue). Blood constructions also emerged in that case, where the Justices focused 
on the logics of dilution—because they relied on blood constructions of racial 
quantification—to undermine the extremely inclusive indigenous 
conceptualizations of Hawaiianness and belonging, which rely on genealogical 
connections that privilege kinship and lineal descent by including all those who 
possess Hawaiian ancestry. In Rice v. Cayetano, the Court targeted these inclusive 
indigenous practices as meaningless. The focus on blood quantum was a 
substantial component in the ruling, which now allows non-Hawaiians—in this 
case, any and all residents of Hawai'i, regardless of ancestry—the right to vote 
in Office of Hawaiian Affairs trustee elections. Furthermore, the case opened 
the way for numerous legal suits designed to dismantle all federal and state-
supported programs that assist Hawaiians with education, health, and housing 
funding and were granted through dozens of congressional legislative acts for 
Native Americans (which include Hawaiians along with Alaska Natives and 
American Indians). And there are also now lawsuits that contest the legal standing 
of the Hawaiian Home Lands territory and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs by 
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arguing that they are racially discriminatory against non-Hawaiians. Disregarding 
the history of blood racialization and classification particular to Hawaiians, these 
plaintiffs argue that "Hawaiian" should be used as a state residency marker, 
even though historically the term, along with "Native Hawaiian" and "native 
Hawaiian" has been reserved for those who are aboriginal descendants, those 
who are indigenous to Hawai'i. The operative assumption in these suits, much 
like Rice v. Cayetano, is that Hawaiian ancestry is arbitrary unless it "measures 
up," and even then, perhaps not. In other words, the aim of the suits is to ensure 
that Hawaiians should not be accorded any distinct rights based on their 
indigeneity. 
In any case, Hawaiians assert the sovereign right to define who counts as 
Hawaiian on grounds of self-determination. It is important to note that in the 
2000 census, 282,667 people in Hawaii identified themselves as at least part 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander—an increase of 74.2 percent from 1990, while 
113,539 described themselves solely as a member of that group (Dingeman and 
Bricking, 2001). This suggests the endurance of Hawaiian indigenous identities, 
regardless of blood quantum and dominant insistence that those who do not 
meet the 50-percent blood rule become honorary whites (or Asians, for that 
matter). 
The configurations of Hawaiians' "lack" of blood, rooted in colonial land 
dispossession and disregard for indigenous sovereignty is analogous to a problem 
highlighted in the work of Epeli Hau'ofa, who examines ways the Pacific has 
been configured to the detriment of Island peoples (1995). He summarizes the 
persistent image of the Pacific as "islands in a far sea," where small island states 
and territories are considered "too small, too poor, and too isolated to develop 
any meaningful degree of autonomy" (1995, 89-90). Hau'ofa argues that this 
view serves as a form of belittlement that is both economically and geographically 
deterministic and, moreover, overlooks historical processes and forms of "world 
enlargement" carried out by island peoples transgressing national and economic 
boundaries that mark colonial legacies and postcolonial relationships. As Hau'ofa 
re-conceptualizes an expansive Oceania, he describes this "world enlargement" 
as a vision whereby Pacific peoples see more than just the ever-growing surface 
of the land as home; they also look to the surrounding ocean, its underworld, 
and the heavens above. On the history of Pacific Islanders, he succinctly notes, 
"their world was anything but tiny, they thought big and recounted their deeds 
in epic proportions" (90-91). Hau'ofa's work in this area enables a re-thinking 
of Hawaiian genealogical practices in ways that counter blood quantum modes 
of identification. 
Thinking big and recounting of deeds in epic proportions also classically 
describes Polynesian genealogical recitation. Genealogy is a Hawaiian form of 
world enlargement that makes nonsense out of fractions and percent signs that 
are grounded in colonial (now neo-colonial) moves marked by exclusionary 
racial criteria. Blood quantum can never account for the political nature and 
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strategic positioning of genealogical invocation. Economically deterministic 
arguments describing the islands as too small, too poor, and too isolated resonate 
with racially deterministic arguments about people with too little, too weak, and 
too diluted Hawaiian "blood." In turn, Hawaiians are emphasizing their 
genealogical connections to all Pacific peoples in reclaiming a place in Oceania. 
This move goes beyond merely locating Hawaiians as Polynesians; more 
significantly, it challenges the legality of the "75 percent white blood" criterion 
for citizenship used in the Stephen case to permit naturalization or the current 
50-percent Hawaiian blood quantum rule to legally define Hawaiianness. 
Notes 
A very early draft of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Studies Association in Montreal, Québec, in 1999. Mahalo to Cindy Franklin, Shari 
Hundorf, and Renee Romano for their productive close readings of this work. Their 
engagement helped me to shape and further develop my arguments here. I also wish to 
thank the three anonymous reviewers and the editors of American Studies for their 
critical comments and suggestions for revision. Any problems with the text remain my 
own responsibility. 
1. Specifically, it states "that all free white persons who have or shall migrate into the 
United States, and shall give satisfactory proof, before a magistrate, by oath, that they intend to 
reside therein, and shall take an oath of allegiance, and shall have resided in the United States for 
one whole year, shall be entitled to the rights of citizenship" (quoted in Jacobson 1998, 22). 
2. Although the first prerequisite case regarding the racially exclusive naturalization law 
came as early as 1878, the majority of the cases were filed during the early 1900s. 
3. However, prior federal rulings had considered "mixed-race" naturalization cases. Lopez 
notes that there were at least seven such cases before 1928. These include: In re Camille, 1880; 
In re Knight, 1909; In re Alverto, 1912; In re Young, 1912; In re Young, 1912; In re Lampitoe, 
1916; and In re Fisher, 1927 (Lopez 1996, 203-207). In all of these cases, the applicants failed to 
establish their whiteness. 
4. I am assuming that the spelling of "Neuru" was a misprint throughout the file and that 
he was from Nauru Island. 
5. For example, there is no African American counterpart. Black people have not been 
fully allowed mixed-race family histories (Zack 1993). In fact, mixed-race status has historically 
never conferred advantage of African Americans, for both in state laws and in common practice 
any identifiable "black" ancestry has routinely been used to disqualify people from entitlements 
and privileges afforded whites. Under the customary "one-drop rule" anyone who has any African 
ancestry has been classified as "black." Barbara Fields has pointed out the illogical, arbitrary 
nature of such rules with her observation that a white woman may give birth to a black child, but 
no black woman can give birth to a white child (Fields 1982, 149). Thus, in the case of African 
Americans, blood degree has been invoked to segregate, rather than to assimilate. 
6. For more on these issues that focus on the Hawaiian case see Kauanui 1998, 1999, 
2002. 
7. There are problems with the terms "Micronesian," "Melanesian," and "Polynesian," 
which have their own histories as anthropological categories of racial classification. Even though 
the key question is whether these categories were salient at the time of the Stephen case, I use 
them here to mark the historical distinction among the groupings, but also maintain the use of the 
term "Pacific Islander," which is not only inclusive of all Pacific peoples, it is also more common 
within contemporary U.S. and Island-contexts. 
8. During the early 1800's, American whalers used Nauru as a base, and by the late 1800's 
the island came under German administration. In 1914 it was surrendered to Australia and was 
therefore guided by British law. Japan invaded and occupied Nauru during World War II, and in 
1945 Australian forces retook the island. In 1947 the UN granted Australia control of the island 
under a UN trusteeship, which was jointly held by Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. 
Since then, the island has gained greater autonomy, beginning with limited internal self-government 
by 1951, and full independence by 1968. It now holds Special Member Status in the British 
Commonwealth. 
9. But the Supreme Court later drew the holding in the Rodriguez case into question when 
it stated in Morrison v. California (219 US 82, 95 n. 5, 1933) that, "whether a person of [Mexican] 
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descent may be naturalized in the United States is still an unsettled question" (cited in Lopez 
1996, 242). 
10. In his work on Mexican Americans and whiteness, George A. Martinez reads this case 
differently, arguing: "The court held that Mexicans were White within the meaning of the 
naturalization laws" (2000, 3). 
11. The Najour case went before a federal court in Georgia, where the judge cited scientific 
evidence and ruled that a Syrian man was considered "white" and so accepted his application for 
naturalization. But just five years later, in the Dow case, another Syrian applicant was not regarded 
as white (Lopez 1996, 68). 
12. In the Ozawa case, a man of Japanese ancestry asserted that his skin color made him 
white. But the U.S. Supreme Court, asserted that "light skin does not foreclose the possibility 
that one is non-White" (cited in Lopez 1996, 82). Here the Court continued to rely on science by 
noting that Japanese would count as Mongolian in the racial taxonomies of the day. In the Thind 
case, the Court rejected its equation in Ozawa of "white" with "Caucasian" when it rejected the 
science of race in response to an East Asian applicant who would have been categorized as 
Caucasian at the time (Lopez 1996, 86). As Lopez notes, in the Thind case, the Court ended the 
reign of the term Caucasian and instead privileged familiar observation and common knowledge 
as to whether the average person would believe Thind belonged to the "white race" (cited in 
Lopez 1996, 91). 
13. For more on the problematic republican equation of whiteness with fitness for self-
government, see Jacobson 1998, 38. 
14. As if the racial designation of Nian was insufficient, the court also decided that Nian 
did not appear to be sufficiently intelligent to become a citizen (261). 
15. Hawaiian resistance to the annexation was well documented—through two memorials 
against the Treaty of Annexation— and powerful enough to stall the passage of such a treaty in 
the U.S. Senate in 1897. Disregarding the will of the people, President McKinley went ahead and 
annexed Hawai'i through domestic law, the Newlands Resolution. For an examination of mass 
Hawaiian resistance to U.S. annexation after the U.S.-backed coup, see Noenoe Silva's path-
breaking work (1997; 1998; 2004; and this volume). I contend that the purported annexation was 
illegal because the United States did not annex the Hawaiian Islands by treaty, as required under 
international law at the time. Moreover, the constitutionality of the U.S. congressional acquisition 
of Hawai'i, merely via an internal domestic law, is questionable. In regard to the authority to 
acquire and establish interim governments for "acquired territories" Chief Justice Taney in Dred 
Scott v. John F.A. Sandford, (60 U.S. 393; 1856) stated: "There is certainly no power given by the 
Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United 
States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial 
limits in any way, except by the admission of new States." Even though Taney noted that "it has 
been held to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for admission at the time, but to be 
admitted as soon as its population and situation would entitle it to admission," and that the 
propriety of admitting a new state is made by the discretion of Congress, the way that Hawai'i 
became admitted as a state over six decades later, in 1959, is also legally questionable. Like 
many other colonial territories worldwide, in 1946 the United States inscribed Hawai'i onto the 
United Nations List of Non-Self-Governing Territories. As such, Hawai'i was eligible for 
decolonization under international law. However, the United States approved a statehood bill for 
Hawai'i based on a vote conducted by the territorial government, rather than a plebiscite as 
mandated by the UN Charter, Chapter XI, Article 73 and General Assembly Resolution 742 
regarding the process of non-self governing territories pursuing self-determination and a form of 
self-government, which should have been undertaken with UN supervision rather that determined 
by the administrating body of the United States Government. And, in 1998, the UN issued a 
report recommending that Hawai'i be returned to a UN List of Non-Self Governing Territories, 
which could make Hawai'i eligible for decolonization as well as a UN-sponsored plebiscite 
(Omandam 1998, 1). 
16. Even if it had been reversed, it is doubtful that he was deported because Stephen had 
lived in Hawai'i since he was eleven years old and could have applied for a suspension of 
deportation. Gordon notes that "persons who are racially ineligible for naturalization are, within 
certain limited exceptions, barred from the United States, are prohibited from obtaining legalization 
of unlawful entries under special registry procedure provided for those who have resided in the 
United States continuously since prior to July 1, 1924, and are excluded from applying for 
suspension of deportation" (Gordon 1945, 240). 
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